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Introduction 
 
While the relationship between political stability/instability and development has received 
considerable attention from economists, sociologists and political scientists, considerably less 
attention has been paid to the socio-economic consequences of party system change or 
instability.  
In their study of the impact of party system change on the quality of democracy in South 
East Asia, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) have presented a new measure that can be used to 
measure the magnitude of party system change during a historical period—or the changeability 
of a country’s party system during that time. They use this newly created measure to investigate 
the relationship between party system change and the “quality of democracy.” To measure the 
latter, they adopted a slightly modified version of the framework proposed by Morlino which 
assesses democratic qualities in terms of procedures (rule of law, electoral accountability, inter-
institutional accountability, competition), outputs (freedoms, equality) and outcome (FDI). 
Applying these frameworks, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) found a statistically significant 
association between the changeability of a party system and two of the indicators used to assess 
the rule of law (physical integrity, corruption perception index), the indicator of inter-
institutional accountability and with the outcome (FDI), but not with other procedural aspects of 
democracy or with the democratic outputs. 
As Tanzanians prepare to go to the polls and the country awaits an election that could 
mark the end of the CCM rule, potentially ushering in dramatic change in the Tanzanian party 
system, analysing the relationship between the changeability of the Tanzanian party system and 
the various aspects of the Tanzanian democracy is both timely and valuable. This is so for at 
least two reasons. First, such an analysis provides a basis for assessing whether and to what 
extent the political consequences of party system change in Tanzania are similar to the 
observations made by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) for the South East Asian region. By doing so, 
we are also able to make a contribution to the comparative study of the consequences of party 
system change—a topic which, as Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) reported, has not been 
adequately covered in the literature. Secondly, such an analysis can also enable us to make some 
tentative, but educated, guesses as to what may happen in Tanzania if, as many observers have 
repeatedly predicted, the Presidential elections of next October mark the end of the CCM’s rule. 
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Tanzania in the the Party Systems Scholarship 
 
For over a hundred years party system attributes have been extensively investigated because they 
provided a clear indication of the characteristics and the functioning of party systems which, in 
turn, were regarded as having wide-ranging effects. Government stability, government 
effectiveness, duration of the constitutional order (Sartori, 1976; Mainwaring, 1993), quality of 
legislation (Tsebelis, 2002), government spending and public debt (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 
1996)—to name just a few outcomes—have all been shown to be affected by party system 
attributes.  
While scholars have devoted considerable attention to investigating the effects of several party 
system attributes on political-system functioning, the consequences of party system change—and 
the related notions of party system stability and instability—have drawn relatively little attention. 
We attempt to investigate exactly this problem in the context of the Tanzanian party system. 
Such an investigation contributes to the (still) small agenda of research on the consequences of 
party system change. Furthermore, because only a few studies have explored the pattern of inter-
party competition in Tanzania (Nyirabu, 2002; Shaba, 2009), we hope that this research can 
contribute more generally to a better understanding of the Tanzanian party system.  
The Tanzanian party system has seldom been investigated and the few studies have been 
somewhat limited in important respects. For instance, scholars have been less than consistent 
regarding how the Tanzanian party system should be categorized and uncertain as to whether (or 
not) the observed pattern of interparty competition was consistent with democratic practice. 
Regarding the question of how the Tanzanian party system should be most appropriately 
categorized, party system scholars have taken various positions. Writing in the wake of the 
transition to multipartyism,
2
 van Cranenburg (1995) argued that the Tanzanian party system 
could have evolved into a dominant-party system while Sanbrook (1996) suggested that it was 
too early to draw conclusions about how the Tanzanian party system had evolved. Nyirobu 
(2002) described the party system as being characterized by the presence of a dominant party and 
a plethora of irrelevant ones without however proposing a proper categorization, while Shaba 
(2009: 2) defined Tanzania as a "one party-state with a multiparty democracy." 
The confusion as to how the Tanzania party system should be conceptualized was coupled with a 
confusion as to whether it should be regarded as democratic or not. In this respect, in fact, 
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 Tanzania adopted multiparty system in 1992 following recommendations from a presidential commission 
popularly referred to as the Justice Nyalali Commission in 1990. This resulted from the general consensus at the 
time that the then economic reforms stood no chance of succeeding unless robust political reforms were put in 
place. The commission was tasked to ask Tanzanians whether they wanted a single party or multiparty system. 
Ironically, despite the fact that 80% of respondents rejected a multiparty system, the Nyalali Commission went on 
to recommend a multiparty system. The decision was based on three main reasons: i) respondents who wanted 
single party system to continue, demanded reforms which could only work under multiparty system ii) the decision 
by the 80% respondent was driven by fear of the unknown having lived under single party system for so long and 
iii) 20% was a sizable amount of population whose voices needed to be heard (Rehani, 2012; Baregu, 2000). 
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Bogaards (2004) showed that depending on how democracy was conceptualized and measured 
the Tanzanian political system could be simultaneously regarded as democratic and non-
democratic. 
While scholars debated the democratic nature of the Tanzanian party system and how it could be 
categorized, they paid little attention to whether the pattern of inter-party competition in 
Tanzania was sufficiently stable to be regarded as a proper party system or whether it displayed 
the kind of instability that was associated with what Sartori (1976) considered ‘fluid polities’. 
And, unsurprisingly given the little attention the Tanzanian party system has received, no 
attention was paid to assessing its stability/instability or to exploring the possible consequences 
of party system stability and instability for the Tanzanian polity as a whole. 
  
From Party System Change to Party System Changeability 
There are two plausible reasons why very few studies have explored the political consequences 
of party system change in Tanzania. The first reason is that the Tanzanian party system has, with 
a few exceptions, been largely neglected by party system analysts. Contributing to this is a 
second reason: that party system scholars have not had efficient and effective tools for measuring 
party system change. Studies customarily equated party system change with electoral change, 
party change, or changes in the cleavage structure, despite the fact that such changes could occur 
without altering the fundamental pattern of competition among parties—or the “functioning” of 
the party system.  
The appearance or disappearance of what Sartori (1976) considered “irrelevant” parties 
represents a clear instance of party change, but precisely because these parties are deemed 
irrelevant their appearance/disappearance does not alter in any way the overall mechanics and 
functioning of a party system. Electoral change occurs of course whenever a party system 
changes. However, electoral changes do not necessarily produce party system change. Indeed, in 
most structured party system, elections where electoral change leads to party-systemic change 
are regarded as relatively exceptional events. Finally, while there is no doubt that a 
transformation of the cleavage structure and voter alignments is inextricably connected with the 
socio-political dimension of party system change, such societal changes can occur without 
transforming the format, mechanics and functioning of a party system. The point can easily be 
illustrated by the fact that a party system (e.g., the UK) in which a Conservative party competes 
against a Liberal party can remain solidly “two-party” if a new Labour party replaces the Liberal 
party as the major rival of the Conservative party. 
While the party system literature has long explored the political consequences of party system 
attributes and party system “types,” which are a function of specific attributes, following 
Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) we are interested in the consequences of party system change 
understood as the change that occurs between party system types. This way we can explore not 
only whether democratic qualities (and possibly the stability of the democratic order) are 
sensitive to the presence (or absence) of specific party system types, but also how they relate to 
party system change. 
In order to assess the changeability of the Tanzanian party system and to explore the relationship 
between the changeability of the party system and various qualities of democracy, we adopt a 
measure of party system changeability recently developed by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015). This 
measure, called Index of fluidity, uses party system change over time to estimate the 
changeability of a party system. In doing so, the authors suggested that the index should capture 
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two distinct aspects of party system change, namely the frequency of change and its scope. The 
authors explained that the frequency of party system change can simply be measured by dividing 
the number of party system changes in the electoral history of a given country by the number of 
elections held in that country. The scope of change was assessed instead on the basis of two 
indicators, namely the number of different types which can be observed in a real-world party 
system during its historical development and the extent to which the mechanics (or functioning) 
of these types differed across these types. By combining the scope and frequency of change, 
Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) created an index of fluidity to capture these salient aspects of party 
system change and changeability. 
We plan to compute this index for Tanzania in order to assess the extent to which the Tanzanian 
party system has been stable over time, and on this basis whether this party system should 
properly be regarded as “fluid” or “structured.” Most importantly, our fluidity computations 
provide a basis for assessing whether and to what extent there is any association between party 
system change in Tanzania and the changeability and qualities of the country’s democracy. 
 
Testing the Case 
The most direct evidence regarding the structuring of the Tanzanian party system—evidence that 
is highly consistent with Sartori’s conceptualization of fluid and structured polities—is the 
observation that the Tanzania party system has historically displayed very little fluidity.
3
 The 
party system that emerged in the country as a result of the 1962  elections was a hegemonic-party 
system, in view of the high electoral returns of the ruling power and the very marginal role that 
other actors were able to play in the political/electoral arena. It was a “one-party” system, 
following Sartori’s definition, for six consecutive elections as this was the period during which a 
plurality of parties was not legally allowed and multi-party competition was prevented from 
occurring; these are precisely the condition under which a party system with one relevant party 
qualifies as one-party. And it became a predominant-party system with the first multiparty 
elections held in 1995 and it has remained predominant until 2010. 
The longevity of the party in power provides an indication of the stability of a party system that 
for about 50 years has remained stably centred on a single relevant party. However, the enduring 
incumbency of one party has occurred alongside change in broader constitutional arrangements. 
The 1965-1995 period of one-party rule can only properly be viewed as a dominant authoritarian 
system, using Sartori’s categories, for the same party remained in power as the sole legal party. 
The party system remained solidly one-party for as long as this constitutional situation persisted, 
which was until 1992 when reforms to reintroduce multiparty competition were enacted. Even 
after this transition the party system has been very resilient to change. Thus, since 1965, there 
have been two systemic changes: a transformation from a hegemonic-party system to a one-party 
system in 1965 and from the latter to a predominant-party system  in the wake of the 1992 
reforms. It is precisely because of such ‘resilience,’ ‘stickiness,’ and ‘stability’—to use Sartori’s 
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 For instance, Shaba (2009) spoke of a one party system in spite of the fact that he acknowledged the existence of 
at least four institutionalized parties. In a similar vein, Basedau and Stroh (2008), who measured party 
institutonalization on the basis fo roots in society, congruence, autonomy and level of organization, showed that 
the Tanzanian ruling party (CCM) was the single most institutonalized party in their sample and that Tanzania had 
the highest score in terms of party institutionalization. 
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terminology—that it cannot not be considered a fluid polity in either its nondemocratic or 
democratic phases.  
The stability of the Tanzanian party system emerges quite clearly from computing its fluidity 
score with the index of fluidity—see Table 1. 
Table 1. Fluidity in Tanzania 
Year of 
elections 
Number of 
elections held 
to date 
Number of 
party system 
changes to 
date 
Types of 
party systems 
Extent of 
change 
Fluidity 
1962 1 - 1 - - 
1965 2 1 2 1 1 
1970 3 1 2 1 .66 
1975 4 1 2 1 .50 
1980 5 1 2 1 .40 
1985 6 1 2 1 .33 
1990 7 1 2 1 .28 
1995 8 2 3 2 1.5 
2000 9 2 3 2 1.33 
2005 10 2 3 2 1.2 
2010 11 2 3 2 1.09 
 
The Tanzanian party system has traditionally had low fluidity. In the 48 years under 
consideration, fluidity has varied from a minimum of .28 to a maximum of 1.5 and it is now at 
1.09. This is a fairly low value in absolute terms for a country that has held 11 elections. In fact, 
if no change had occurred the fludity index would have registered a value of 0 (zero). If the 
Tanzanian party system had changed in 10 of the 11 elections, had embodied all 7 party system 
types, with an extent of 6 the party system would have had a maximum fluidity score of 38.18. 
The fact that Tanzania has a stable party system
4
 emerges with some clarity once we compare the 
estimates of our computation for Tanzania with similar computations for other African nations. 
In 2012, the index of fluidity registered a value of 2.25 in Cameroon; 3 in Uganda; 3.27 in Benin 
and Zambia; 3.375 in Cape Verde; 3.6 in Angola, Senegal and Sierra Leone; 4.8 in Kenya, 6 in 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali; 6.4 in Mauritania; 8 in Sudan; and 10.28 in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
The Tanzanian party system has displayed considerable stability even in comparison with non-
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 Note that another presidential commission (Judge Kisanga Commission) was formed in 2000 and was tasked to 
“coordinate views on constitution”. While this commission shied away from referring to Justice Nyalali’s report, it 
endorsed a significant number of its recommendations (Rehani, 2012; Baregu, 2000). The Kisanga Commission 
went on to recommend for independent candidacy something which was and is still fiercely rejected by the ruling 
CCM. The obvious fear is that independent candidacy would breed party indiscipline which could eventually prove 
to be the demise of CCM. 
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African party systems. In fact, with a fluidity score of 1.09 the Tanzanian party system is more 
stable than the party system in Malaysia (1.16 in 2013), Cambodia (3.6 in 2013), Indonesia (4.8 
in 2009), and Thailand (12.22 in 2011).  
Party System Stability and its Correlates 
Before employing our measure of fludity to investigate the consequences of party system  
stability in Tanzania, we plan to assess the validity and the reliability of the index of fluidity. 
With regard to testing the validity of the index, we correlate the index of fluidity with two 
measures of stability computed by the Center for Systemic Peace. The Center for Systemic Peace 
produces and regularly updates several datasets. The Polity IV dataset is best known for 
providing a wealth of information on various characateristics of a political system including its 
level or quality of democracy – which is tracked by a variable called Polity 2 – and its stability. 
Stability is measured by a variable called ‘durable’ which tracks the number of years without a 
change in the nature of a political system. The Center of Systemic Peace also compiles a dataset 
on State Fragility. One of the variables included in this dataset is called the State Fragility Index 
(SFI) which can be used as a proxy of political stability since the fragility of the state and the 
stability of a political system are two sides of the same coin – see Table 2. 
 By correlating the index of fluidity with these two measures of stability, we find that our 
index is strongly and significantly related to both the SFI and to the durability of a political 
system. Higher levels of state fragility are associated with higher levels of party system fluidity, 
whereas lower levels of durability (of the political system) are associated with higher levels of 
party system fluidity – see Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2.  
 
Table 2. Correlation Analysis: Fluidity, Durability and State Fragility (sig.) 
 SFI Durable 
Fluidity .899 
(.000) 
-.966 
(.000) 
SFI 1.0 -.913 
(.000) 
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Figure 1. Party System Fluidity and political system durability 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Party System Fluidity and State Fragility 
 
 
 
Our estimates of fluidity are fairly stable and consistent over time. In fact, when we correlate the 
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levels of fluidity recorded for each year in the 1995-2013 period with one another, we find that 
all correlation coefficients are strong, positive and statistically significant – see Table 3. 
Table 3. Correlation: Index of Fluidity (sig.) 
 Index of 
Fluidity 
Index of 
fluidity T-1 
Index of 
fluidity T-2 
Index of 
fluidity T-3 
Index of 
fluidity T-4 
Index of 
Fluidity T-5 
Index of 
fluidity 
1 .936 
(.000) 
.884 
(.000) 
.855 
(.000) 
.876 
(.000) 
.955 
(.000) 
 
Index of 
fluidity T-1 
 1 .928 
(.000) 
.870 
(.000) 
.841 
(.000) 
.862 
(.000) 
Index of 
fluidity T-2 
  1 .928 
(.000) 
.870 
(.000) 
.841 
(.000) 
Index of 
fluidity T-3 
   1 .928 
(.000) 
.870 
(.000) 
Index of 
fluidity T-4 
    1 .937 
(.000) 
Index of 
Fluidity T-5 
     1 
 
While the evidence presented so far sustains the claim that the index of fluidity is valid and 
reliable, it provides no indication as to whether party system instability has any detectable impact 
on the quality or the qualities of Tanzanian democracy. 
Party System Changeability and Democratic Qualities 
In the South East region, the changeability of the party system had no significant impact on 
electoral self-determination, levels of political competition, civil liberties, and political rights, 
but it had a significant impact on physical integrity, levels of corruption, inter-institutional 
accountability and foreign direct investments. 
By analyzing the Tanzanian data for the 1995-2014 period, we find that there are both 
similarities and differences in the way in which party system changebility affects the various 
democratic qualities.  
Table 4. The Political Consequences of Fluidity (sig.) 
 Index of fluidity 
Physint .051 
(.846) 
Control of corruption -.507 
(.054) 
XCONST * 
FHPR .894 
(.000) 
FHCL .816 
(.000) 
FDI -.493 
(.032) 
* cannot be computed because XCONST is constant 
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With regard to the differences, our data analysis reveals three major differences. First of all, 
while in the South East Asian region party system changeability was shown to have a statistically 
significant impact on physical integrity, party system changeability has no impact whatsoever on 
physical integrity in the Tanzanian case. This means that party system changes and the 
corresponding increases in party system changeability are not related to citizens’ physical 
integrity. Second, while party system changeability had no impact on the level of political rights 
and civil liberties in South East Asia, the data analysis conducted in the course of this study 
reveals a strong, positive, and statistcially significant correlation between party system 
changeability and the level of rights and liberties. Specifically, higher levels of party system 
changeability are associated with and possibily responsible for lower levels of civil rights and 
political liberties. This evidence indicates, therefore, that party system changeability, in addition 
to not improving democracy (as in the case of physical integrity) and possibly worsening it (as in 
the case of corruption), significantly damages the quality of democracy in terms of outputs. 
Third, while the party system changeability was shown to have a strong and significant impact 
on the level of inter-institutional accountability, as reflected by the XCONST variable included 
in the Polity IV database, it has no detectable impact in the Tanzanian case. In fact, in the 20 
years under consideration there was no change in the level of interinstitutional accountability, 
despite fluctuations in the level of fluidity. 
With regard to the similarities, our data analysis reveals three basic similarities. First, just like in 
the South East Asian region, the level of competition in the Tanzanian political system is not 
affected by fluctuations in the level of party system changeability. Second,  as in South East 
Asia, higher levels of party system changeaility are associated with, and possibly are responsible 
for, a greater inability to control corruption or with higher levels of corruption. Third, just like in 
South East Asia, the level of Foreign Direct Investments is strongly, negatively and statistically 
significantly affected by party system changeability. This means that when party system change 
occurs and the level of party system changeability is high, the amount of FDI flowing into a 
country tends to decrease. This correlation can be intuitively explained: investors do not like 
uncertainty and the changeability of the party system is perceived to increase the uncertainty of 
doing business in a given country and, as a result, investors tend to refrain from investing in 
places with high changeability/uncertainty. 
Drawing together these various observations, an important conclusion emerges: In contrast to 
South East Asia, where party system changeability was shown to have at least some beneficial 
impact on some qualities of democracy, in the Tanzanian case the changeability of the party 
system is consistently detrimental. In terms of procedure it is associated with more corruption, in 
terms of outputs it is associated with an erosion of rights and liberties, and in terms of outcome it 
is associated with a decline in international standing, reputation, and credibility as evidenced by 
the fact that international investors are deterred from investing in countries with a highly 
changeable party system. 
Conclusions 
Tanzanians may well be looking forward to ousting CCM after all these years in power, to 
having a more competitive party system, and to ending what has been a long-standing 
predominant party system (Nwokora and Pelizzo, 2014). And, quite understandably, they may 
also hold high expectations for the new government and hope, in particular, that its policies will 
improve development in the country. However, the data presented here sugget reasons for 
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caution. In many cases, the few decisive party system changes in the past have not improved 
democratic qualities. Worse, in some cases the party system change and corresponding increases 
in party system changeability have been associated with a clear deterioration of democratic 
qualities. 
If the next party system change is going to be as momentous as observers expect it to be, there is 
a chance that the instability it creates will not improve democratic qualities, and may even lead 
to a deterioration in such qualities, and perhaps also problems in attracting FDI. In combination, 
the prospects for development may not necessarily be enhanced by the significant political 
transformation that observers predict. The sad lesson that one should learn from our data is that 
stability has merits and that change for the sake of change, and perhaps even change in the hope 
of a better, more democratic, more prosperous future, may actually pave the way to less 
prosperity and to a more dysfunctional democratic order.  
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